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Punishment and Its Limits
Debra Parkes*

I. INTRODUCTION
The nearly three decades in which Beverley McLachlin was a
member of the Supreme Court, including 18 as Chief Justice, witnessed a
number of shifts in Canadian penal policy and in the reach and impact of
criminal law. During the Harper decade (2006 to 2015) in which the
federal Conservatives enjoyed a majority government led by Prime
Minister Stephen Harper, criminal justice policy took a turn toward the
punitive. The federal government tore a page out of the American
legislative handbook and sought to “govern through crime”,1 albeit in a
more restrained Canadian style.2 Criminologists Anthony Doob and
Cheryl Webster have posited that pre-Harper, Canadian criminal justice
policy was grounded in four pillars that enjoyed support across party
lines. These pillars were that social conditions matter; that harsh
punishments do not reduce crime; that the development of criminal
justice policies should be informed by expert knowledge; and that
changes in the criminal law should address real problems.3 These
principles were cast aside, Doob and Webster argue, beginning at least in
2006 with the passage of numerous crime bills that, to name just a few,
created new crimes with enhanced penalties;4 proliferated mandatory
*

Debra Parkes, Professor and Chair in Feminist Legal Studies, Peter A. Allard School of
Law, University of British Columbia. I am grateful to Benjamin Berger and Sonia Lawrence for
inviting me to speak on this topic at the 2018 Constitutional Cases Conference, to Haley Hrymak
and Erica Sandhu for their research assistance, and to the anonymous reviewer for insightful
comments.
1
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
2
See, for example, Debra Parkes, “The Punishment Agenda in the Courts” (2014) 67
S.C.L.R. 589 [hereinafter “‘The Punishment Agenda in the Courts’”].
3
Anthony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “The Harper Revolution in Criminal Justice Policy…
and What Comes Next” (2015) 36(3) Policy Options 24.
4
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (auto theft and trafficking in property obtained by
crime), S.C. 2010, c. 14, amending Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal
Code”], ss. 333, 333.1 (theft of a motor vehicle), s. 353.1 (obliterating a vehicle identification
number), ss. 355.1-355.5 (new proceeds of crime offences); An Act to amend the Criminal Code
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minimum sentences; reduced the availability of conditional sentences
served in the community;5 made it easier to have someone declared a
dangerous offender (and therefore, imprisoned indefinitely);6 removed
opportunities for early parole;7 and more.
While this account is compelling and importantly identifies a key
(overtly) punitive turn,8 Canadian criminal law has long been rooted in
punishment, albeit a punitiveness that is sometimes draped in a “liberal
veil”.9 For example, it was a previous Liberal government that enacted
the first batch of mandatory minimum sentences for firearms offences as
part of its gun control legislation introduced in 1995.10 During the 2000s,
the New Democratic Party government in Manitoba was unabashedly
“tough on crime”, regularly calling on the federal government to enact
more punitive criminal laws, including new offences and longer
sentences.11 Politicians of all stripes have contributed to the expansion of
the criminal law throughout Canada’s history.12
Whatever its history or purposes, the evidence is clear: Canadian
criminal law does not deliver on many of its promises and its impact is
not distributed evenly across society. The #MeToo movement has called
attention to how underreported and pervasive sexual violence is in
(identity theft and related misconduct), S.C. 2009, c. 28, amending Criminal Code, id., s. 56.1, ss.
402.1-403; An Act to amend the Criminal Code (unauthorized recording of a movie), S.C. 2007, c.
28, amending Criminal Code, s. 431.2.
5
Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, amending Criminal Code, id., s. 742.1.
6
Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6, amending Criminal Code, id., Part XXIV,
s. 752ff. See Jordan Thompson, “Reconsidering the Burden of Proof in Dangerous Offender Law:
Canadian Jurisprudence, Risk Assessment and Aboriginal Offenders” (2016) 79 Sask. L. Rev. 49,
citing an increase in the number of dangerous offender designations following the amendments and
noting that various aspects of the new regime “have overwhelmingly contributed to the increase in
DOs as a whole and specifically, DOs with Aboriginal identity” (at 50).
7
Abolition of Early Parole Act, S.C. 2011, c. 11, s. 10(1), repealing s. 125(1) of the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20. But, see Canada (Attorney General) v.
Whaling, [2014] S.C.J. No. 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R 392 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”] (declaring the
retrospective application of this change invalid under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
8
See generally, “The Punishment Agenda in the Courts”, supra, note 2, at 591-94 and
Debra Parkes, “Women in Prison: Liberty, Equality and Thinking Outside the Bars” (2017) 12 J.L.
& Equality 127, at 132-36.
9
Kelly Hannah-Moffatt and Dawn Moore, “The liberal veil: revisiting Canadian penality”
in John Pratt et al., The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories and Perspectives (U.K.: Willan Press,
2005) 85.
10
Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39.
11
Andrew Woolford and Jasmine Thomas, “Exceptionalism and Deputization under Today’s
NDP: Neo-liberalism, the Third Way, and Crime Control in Manitoba” (2011) 26:1 C.J.L.S. 113.
12
Jula Hughes, “Restraint and Proliferation in Criminal Law” (2010) 15(1) Rev. Const.
Stud. 117, at 119.
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contemporary Canada, and how the vast majority of sexual assault
survivors do not even seek justice in the criminal system.13 The 2018 jury
acquittal of Gerald Stanley, a white farmer in Saskatchewan, for the
murder of Colten Boushie, a young Cree man, has prompted
#JusticeForColten rallies and called attention, once again, to systemic
racism in the criminal justice system.14 Indigenous People are, at once,
over-policed, over-incarcerated, and under-protected by Canadian law.
While crime rates have declined or remained static in recent decades,
calls for more punitive laws resonate with the public, resulting in our
prisons and jails being packed with people who are Indigenous, poor,
racialized and disproportionately dealing with disabling mental health
issues. The shocking number of missing and murdered Indigenous
women15 has, until recently, been met with indifference and utterly
inadequate justice system responses. At the same time, Indigenous women
now account for an astonishing 38 per cent of women in federal prisons,16
despite comprising less than four per cent of the general population.
These realities are evidence of the extent to which we overuse
criminal law to address social problems, at great human and fiscal cost.
We persist in pursuing punishment over more productive ways of dealing
with harm and anti-social behaviour. We ignore the social determinants
of crime. And we have become complacent about the deep inequalities
throughout the criminal justice system. These conditions cry out for
fundamental reform of our criminal law.
It is, of course, not the role of the Supreme Court (or any court) to set
criminal justice policy; that is the role of government. However, in the
37 years since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched
in Canadian law, it is unquestionably the role of judges to answer the
13
Zosia Bielski, “How sexual assault survivors look beyond police, courts for justice”
Globe and Mail (February 4, 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/how-sexualassault-survivors-look-beyond-police-courts-forjustice/article33893684/>.
14
The killings of Helen Betty Osborne (Cree) and J.J. Harper (Oji-Cree) with impunity in
Manitoba in the 1980s prompted the sweeping Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba. See Murray
Sinclair and Alvin Hamilton, Commissioners, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba
(Winnipeg: Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, 1991). The Report’s opening words, “The justice system has
failed Manitoba’s Aboriginal people on a massive scale,” remain true today.
15
Margo McDiarmid, “Still no way to tell how many Indigenous women and girls go
missing in Canada each year” CBC News (December 20, 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/indigenous-missing-women-police-data-1.4449073> (a 2014 report by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police found 164 Indigenous women who were missing and 1,017 Indigenous women who
had been murdered over the past 30 years, but many advocates believe the numbers to be higher).
16
Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator 20162017 (June 28, 2017), at 48, online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20162017eng.pdf>.
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constitutional questions that come before them and, where appropriate, to
find laws and government action invalid for overstepping constitutional
bounds.17 Furthermore, in the course of interpreting criminal provisions —
even in non-constitutional cases — courts are guided by values and
assumptions that result in expanding or contracting the scope of criminal
liability and punishment. One such value is the principle of restraint, codified
in section 718.2(d) and (e) of the Criminal Code.18 Section 718.2 states, in
part that “(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive
sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (e) all available
sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances
and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be
considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of
Aboriginal offenders.” Beyond sentencing, the principle of restraint is rooted
in liberal concerns about individual liberty. Appeals to restraint may also be
grounded in a more fundamental skepticism, informed by evidence of the
criminal justice system’s failure to deliver on its promises and the disconnect
between its liberal assumptions (i.e., that humans are free, rational, and equal)
and the realities of social inequality.19
In the years since the Charter was enacted, the Supreme Court of Canada
has been called on to determine the constitutionality of various punitive
measures, some old and some new. This article explores the way that some
of those constitutional questions were answered, with a focus on McLachlin
opinions, both before and after she became Chief Justice. It examines the
extent to which she was a force for reining in the punishment agenda,
particularly during the latter half of her time on the Court. The paper does
not purport to comprehensively examine Justice McLachlin’s criminal law
decisions for evidence of restraint or proliferation of punishment. Such a
review would no doubt reveal a mixed record. Some decisions such as
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford20 and Carter v. Canada (Attorney
General)21 eliminated criminal liability for acts related to prostitution and
17
See generally, Beverley McLachlin, “Charter Myths” (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23-36, at
31 (identifying as one of six Charter myths “The Myth that Courts can Decline to Decide Charter
Issues”). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
18
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
19
See generally, Marie-Ève Sylvestre, “‘Moving Towards a Minimalist and Transformative
Criminal Justice System’: Essay on the Reform of the Objectives and Principles of Sentencing”, report
prepared for the Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada (August 5, 2016),
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/pps-opdp/pps-opdp.pdf> [hereinafter “Sylvestre, ‘Moving
Towards’”].
20
[2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.).
21
[2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.).
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assisted suicide as these offences were found to violate the Charter. Others,
such as notably her decision in R. v. Creighton,22 held that the Charter did
not require a subjective standard of fault for criminal offences and that a
broad range of crimes (such as manslaughter and criminal negligence
causing bodily harm) only required a lower standard of objective fault.
Creighton substantially expanded the scope of criminal liability beyond what
had been assumed at common law.23
While that kind of thorough review of Justice McLachlin’s impact on
criminal law would be a welcome contribution to the literature, this paper
has a more modest focus. It zeroes in on the opinions she wrote in
constitutional cases about sentencing and penal laws, including two
decisions released in her final years on the bench, R. v. Nur24 and R. v.
Lloyd,25 striking down mandatory minimum sentences for unjustifiably
infringing section 12 of the Charter. It also considers an earlier decision
rendered in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),26 on the
unconstitutionality of prisoner voting bans. The McLachlin opinions in
these cases speak back in various ways to punitive laws and, in all of
them, she led the Court — either by majority or unanimity — to impose
firm limits on the state’s right to punish. She is, at times, refreshingly
blunt in her rejection of unsupported assertions by government of the
benefits of punitive laws. Looking back at some of her early decisions
shows that these concerns were long-standing for Justice McLachlin,
including when she dissented from majority decisions upholding the
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences.27 The paper
concludes with a brief consideration of the guidance provided through
this body of case law to future courts dealing with constitutional
challenges to punitive laws and policies.

22

[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
For critical analyses of the way these decisions expand criminal liability through
excluding subjective factors and social context from the assessment of criminal fault, see Marie-Ève
Sylvestre, “The Redistributive Potential of Section 7 of the Charter: Incorporating Socio-Economic
Context in Criminal Law and in the Adjudication of Rights” (2010-2011) 42 Ottawa L. Rev. 389
[hereinafter “Sylvestre, ‘Redistributive Potential’”] and Isabel Grant, “Developments in Substantive
Criminal Law: the 1993-94 Term” (1995) 6 S.C.L.R. (2d) 209.
24
[2015] S.C.J. No. 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”].
25
[2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lloyd”].
26
[2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé”].
27
See her dissents in R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter Goltz”] and R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Morrisey”] discussed infra, text accompanying notes 59 and 60.
23
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RESTRAINING PUNISHMENT

The everyday practice of sentencing in courtrooms across the country,
as well as the adjudication of constitutional cases involving challenges to
sentencing practices or particular punishments is far removed from the
realities of incarceration and largely disconnected from the way that its
principles and goals are achieved (or not) through the sanctions imposed.
A classic case in point is the persistence in appealing to the principle of
deterrence in sentencing, despite decades of research showing that
sentence severity generally does not influence decisions to commit crime
or not.28 Another example is the disconnect between what we know about
the lack of oversight and accountability of imprisonment29 and numerous
instances of lawlessness in Canadian prisons;30 and assumptions about
prisons as safe places for rehabilitation31 and personal transformation.
Numerous reports have documented abuses, illegality, and a lack of
meaningful oversight of imprisonment in Canada,32 but sentencing
generally proceeds without consideration of these facts — what
conditions the individual will likely experience in federal or provincial
prisons — and on the shaky assumption that rehabilitation is a realistic
expectation in most cases.33 There is a chasm between what we know
about punishment and what we do, in the same way as there is a deep
disconnect between what we know about human motivation, choice,
constraint, and the assumptions we make about fault in substantive
criminal law.34
28
Anthony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “Searching for Sasquatch: Deterrence of Crime
Through Sentence Severity” in Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, eds., Oxford Handbook of
Sentencing and Corrections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 173.
29
Debra Parkes, “Imprisonment and the Rule of Law” in Janine Lespérance et al., eds.,
Canada and the Rule of Law (Ottawa: International Commission of Jurists Canada, 2017) 193.
30
See, for example, the events surrounding the death of 19-year-old Ashley Smith in a
federal segregation cell while correctional officers watched, a death that was later ruled a homicide
by a coroner’s inquest jury. Chief Coroner of Ontario, Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith:
Jury Verdict and Recommendations (December 2013), online:
<http://www.caefs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/A.S.-Inquest-Jury-Verdict-and-Recommen
dations1.pdf>.
31
There are many examples of defence counsel asking for federal prison time for their
client, on the assumption that they will have access to programs and supports. See, for example, R. v.
Haultain, [2012] A.J. No. 1114, 2012 ABCA 318 (Alta. C.A.).
32
See, for example, Louise Arbour, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events
at the Prison for Women in Kingston (Canada: Public Works and Government Services, 1996).
33
For a thoughtful take on how prison conditions should inform sentencing decisions see
Lisa Kerr, “Sentencing Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of Punishment”
(2017) 32(2) C.J.L.S. 187-207.
34
Sylvestre, “Moving Towards”, supra, note 19.
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1. Mandatory Sentences
The constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences has emerged
as a contested site in debates over the limits of punishment and two
recent McLachlin decisions have intervened in a significant way in those
debates. Mandatory minimum sentences appeal in a simplistic way to
public calls for safety and accountability for crime. However, they
contribute to the mass incarceration of Indigenous people, do not deter
crime, and are extremely costly in human and fiscal terms.35 In pursuit of
their underlying purpose — to remove discretion from judges perceived
to be overly lenient in sentencing — these sentences transfer discretion
to the unreviewable charging decisions of prosecutors.36 Mandatory
sentencing laws have proliferated37 in Canada over the past 25 years and
until recently, Charter rights have not acted as a meaningful check on
governments intent on enacting them. In the decades following the early
Charter decision in R. v. Smith,38 declaring a mandatory seven-year
sentence for importing a narcotic invalid on the basis that it amounted to
35
Isabel Grant & Elizabeth Sheehy, “Cleaning Up the Mandatory Minimums Mess” Policy
Options (May 8, 2018), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2018/cleaning-up-themandatory-minimums-mess/>.
36
Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory
Minimum Sentences” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 149, at 150-52 [hereinafter “Parkes, ‘From Smith to
Smickle’”]. It is important to remember, however, that individual Crown attorneys are subject to
prosecutorial guidelines that limit their discretion, including in cases involving mandatory minimum
sentences. See, for example, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, Chapter 6.4
Mandatory Minimum Penalties under the Criminal Code, online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.
ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/p6/ch04.html#section_2>. That section states that it “will generally
be inappropriate to either agree to a plea to a lesser offence, or to stay or withdraw a charge, when it
is done with the intent of avoiding the imposition of an MMP, where the evidence supports the
original charge. Also, where there are two possible charges in a prosecution and one has an MMP
and one does not, or both have an MMP but one is higher than the other, the one with the MMP or
the one with the highest MMP should proceed.” Federal prosecutors need the consent of the Chief
Federal Prosecutor to agree to stay or withdraw an offence with a mandatory sentence.
37
For a paper published in 2012, I tallied nearly 100 mandatory sentences, with the vast
majority of those being added in the preceding 20 years: Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle”, id. I
counted 84 mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code, supra, note 4, and 14 in the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act”] (counting a hybrid offence as one even where there is a minimum sentence for both
indictable and summary options; and counting a first offence minimum as one and a subsequent
offence minimum as another). A study by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association identified
approximately 50 mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code, noting that different
methods of counting may yield different absolute numbers while concluding that “it is beyond doubt
that mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment are a growing trend in Canada”: Raji Mangat,
More than We Can Afford: The Costs of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing (Vancouver: British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2014), at 9.
38
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.).
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cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court went quiet, upholding
a number of mandatory minimum sentences39 on the basis that they were
not “grossly disproportionate” when applied to the accused and a limited
range of hypothetical cases, meaning that they did not “shock the
conscience of Canadians”.40
The trajectory of the Supreme Court’s section 12 jurisprudence took a
turn in 2015. In her opinion R. v. Nur,41 and shortly thereafter in R. v.
Lloyd,42 the Chief Justice breathed life into the analysis that determines
whether a measure constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, making
section 12 a more meaningful check on the overreach and harms of
mandatory sentences. At issue in Nur was section 95(2)(a) of the
Criminal Code, which imposes a three-year minimum sentence for
possession of a firearm that is loaded or kept with readily accessible
ammunition, where the Crown proceeds by indictment. The problem with
the mandatory sentence in Nur, as the Chief Justice stated, is that it
“casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct.”43 Indeed, this is the
reality for most mandatory sentences. However, more specifically, the
offence in Nur is a hybrid one for which the Crown may proceed
summarily or by indictment. It punishes conduct that is very dangerous
and morally blameworthy, as well as much less serious scenarios. For
Chief Justice McLachlin, it was important to consider the full reach of
the sanction to determine its constitutionality.
The Chief Justice flatly rejected the submissions of provincial
attorneys general who argued that in reviewing a mandatory minimum
sentence for compliance with section 12 a court should only consider its
impact on the accused person before the Court. Her decision made it
39
See, for example, R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.)
(mandatory life sentence and mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility period for first degree murder);
Goltz, supra, note 27 (minimum seven days in prison and $300 fine for a first offence of driving
while prohibited); Morrisey, supra, note 27 (four-year minimum sentence for manslaughter
committed with a firearm); R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Latimer”] (mandatory life sentence and minimum 10-year parole ineligibility period for
second degree murder).
40
Lloyd, supra, note 25, at para. 33. For a sample of the critical commentary on this
deferential line of cases, see Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367; Peter Sankoff, “The Perfect Storm: Section 12,
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and the Problem of the Unusual Case” (2013) 21:3 Constitutional
Forum Constitutionnel 1; Benjamin Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum
Sentences, the Rule of Law, and R. v. Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101 [hereinafter “Berger,
‘More Lasting Comfort’”]; Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle”, supra, note 36.
41
Nur, supra, note 24.
42
Lloyd, supra, note 25.
43
Nur, supra, note 24, at para. 82.
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clear that the key “question is simply whether it is reasonably foreseeable
that the mandatory minimum sentence will impose sentences that are
grossly disproportionate to some peoples’ situations, resulting in a
violation of s. 12.”44 The only limit on this analysis is that “far-fetched”
or “remote” situations are excluded.45 She confirmed that the personal
characteristics of people potentially caught by the mandatory minimum
cannot be excluded from the analysis, noting that “what is reasonably
foreseeable necessarily requires consideration of the sort of situations
that may reasonably be expected to be caught by the mandatory
minimum, based on experience and common sense.”46 In doing so, she
reinvigorated the analysis from Smith that had been significantly limited
in the intervening section 12 decisions of the top court.
In applying the new reasonable foreseeability approach to the
sentence at issue in Nur, the Chief Justice cited the hypothetical
identified by the Court of Appeal, namely “a situation at the licensing
end of the spectrum of conduct caught by section 95(1) for which a
three-year sentence would be grossly disproportionate — where a person
who has a valid licence for an unloaded restricted firearm at one
residence, safely stores it with ammunition in another residence, e.g. at
her cottage rather than her dwelling house.”47 Situations like this one that
are essentially licensing offences have arisen in the case law and are
clearly within the foreseeable application of the law, although it may be
rare for the Crown to proceed by indictment in such cases. On that point,
the Chief Justice cited Smith to reject the argument of the attorneys
general that prosecutorial discretion could be relied on to salvage the
constitutionality of the mandatory sentence.
In thinking about the limits of punishment, a particularly significant
aspect of Nur is the Chief Justice’s candid discussion of the principle of
deterrence as it relates to sentencing severity. Considering whether the
section 12 violation entailed by the mandatory sentence was a reasonable
limit under section 1, she noted that “[d]oubts concerning the effectiveness
of incarceration as a deterrent have been longstanding”,48 citing the 1987
Sentencing Commission Report.49 She went on to cite the extensive
44

Id., at para. 57.
Id., at para. 68, citing Goltz, supra, note 27.
46
Nur, id., at para. 74.
47
Id., at para. 79.
48
Id., at para. 113.
49
Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach — Report
of the Canadian Sentencing Commission (Ottawa: The Commission, 1987).
45
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criminological literature which “suggests that mandatory minimum
sentences do not, in fact, deter crimes”.50 As one commentator recently
noted, “it is difficult to contain the logic of this ruling to mandatory
minimum sentences alone.”51 Indeed, shortly after Nur, the Chief Justice
signed onto the dissenting opinion of Gascon J. in R. v. Lacasse,52 in
which the dissenters would have overturned a trial judge’s sentencing
decision for impaired driving causing death because it overemphasized
deterrence, minimized key mitigating factors, and did not individuate.
While Nur dealt with firearms, it was a drug offence at issue in
Lloyd.53 Section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances
Act54 mandated a minimum sentence of one year in prison for trafficking
or possession for the purpose of trafficking in a Schedule I drug such as
heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, where the individual has been
convicted of any drug offence other than simple possession within the
previous 10 years. The Chief Justice developed and applied the more
nuanced reasonable foreseeability analysis she introduced in Nur,
holding that the mandatory one-year sentence caught within its net
conduct for which the sentence would be grossly disproportionate. In
addition to selling drugs, the definition of trafficking includes sharing or
administering a drug, meaning that the mandatory sentence would apply
to a person addicted to drugs who shared a small amount of drugs with a
friend or spouse and who had a conviction for a similar offence nine
years earlier.55 The provision applies to any amount of Schedule I drugs
and the previous conviction need not even be for a Schedule I drug; it
could be a conviction in relation to a small amount of marijuana, for
example. Many street-level traffickers, who are themselves users, are
paid in drugs and only traffic to support their addiction. The Chief Justice
foresaw the mandatory sentence applying to an individual such as this
who, between conviction and sentence, was able to address the addiction
through treatment and was not deserving of a one-year jail sentence, but
a sentencing judge would be required to make that order. She concluded

50

Id., at para. 114.
Benjamin L. Berger, “Reform of the Purposes and Principles of Sentencing: A Think Piece”,
report prepared for the Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada (October 2016),
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/rpps-ropp/RSD_RR2016-eng.pdf>, at 9 [hereinafter
“Berger, ‘Think Piece’”].
52
[2015] S.C.J. No. 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 (S.C.C.).
53
Supra, note 25.
54
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
55
Lloyd, supra, note 25.
51
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that such a sentence would be grossly disproportionate in the circumstances
and would “shock the conscience of Canadians”.56
In declaring the mandatory sentence in Lloyd invalid, the McLachlin
majority required that Parliament either narrow the penalty’s reach to
“catch only conduct that merits the mandatory minimum sentence” or to
“provide for residual judicial discretion to impose a fit and constitutional
sentence in exceptional cases.”57 Notably, the dissent in Lloyd looked to
the Court’s previous jurisprudence on mandatory sentences and
suggested that Parliament is traditionally entitled to deference and “not
obliged to create exemptions to mandatory minimums as a matter of
constitutional law.”58 It is certainly the case that Nur and Lloyd marked a
departure from the deferential stance of the Supreme Court jurisprudence
on mandatory sentences, but it was a welcome one that had been
foreshadowed by a number of Justice McLachlin’s earlier opinions.
Beginning very earlier in her tenure on the Court, McLachlin J.
dissented in the 1991 decision in Goltz,59 where the majority upheld a
mandatory seven-day prison sentence. She would have found it to violate
section 12 of the Charter, taking the view that for the constitutional
analysis to be meaningful it needed to consider reasonable hypotheticals
that might arise. A decade later she also signed on to Arbour J.’s dissent
in Morrisey,60 a decision acknowledging that mandatory minimums had
the effect of inflating the sentencing floor for crimes to which they were
attached. As in her dissent in Goltz, the dissenting opinion in Morrisey
emphasized the need for a meaningful reasonable hypothetical analysis,
one that considered characteristics and circumstances of accused persons
that might reasonably arise. Finally, the Chief Justice’s unanimous
decision for the Court in R. v. Ferguson,61 also foreshadowed the
approach she later took on behalf of the Court in Nur. In Ferguson, the
question before the Court was whether an individual could be exempted
under section 24(1) of the Charter from the application of an otherwise
valid mandatory minimum sentence if it would be unconstitutional as
applied to that person. Chief Justice McLachlin ruled that constitutional
exemptions were not available to remedy unconstitutional sentences. If a
law produced unconstitutional effects as it applied to anyone, that law
56
57
58
59
60
61
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was invalid and should be so declared. While this decision denied a
discretionary remedy in some cases, it was a bold statement of
Parliament’s responsibility to enact constitutional laws; the Court was
not going to clean up Parliament’s mess or remedy its overreach.
Benjamin Berger aptly predicted that Ferguson “may trouble the easy
politics around minimum sentences and will at least send the right
judicial message about the substantive demands we make of our penal
laws”.62
The recent decisions in Nur and Lloyd are important for the life they
breathe into the section 12 analysis. However, the pathologies of our
criminal justice system run much deeper than the proliferation of
mandatory minimum sentences and the gross disproportionality standard
for section 12 remains a high bar. In short, “a great deal of unfairness can
take place short of gross disproportionality”.63 Therefore, it is heartening
that concern about over-reaching punitiveness emerges in other cases
involving the constitutionality of sentencing measures, including in R. v.
Safarzadeh-Markhali.64 At a time of soaring pre-trial detention rates,65
the Harper government passed the Truth in Sentencing Act66 which aimed
to eliminate enhanced credit for pre-trial detention. The Chief Justice
wrote the unanimous opinion in Safarzadeh-Markhali, declaring invalid
the denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody when the person
being sentenced was denied bail primarily because of a prior
conviction.67 The impact of this provision was found to be
unconstitutionally overbroad because it deprived individuals of their
liberty in ways that have nothing to do with its legislative purpose of
enhancing public safety and security.68
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2. Prisoner Disenfranchisement
We turn now to another key McLachlin decision, this time outside the
sentencing context. Sauvé69 dealt with the constitutionality of a prisoner
voting ban and McLachlin C.J.C.’s majority opinion took aim at the excesses
of punishment. She also signed on to other decisions limiting punishment
such as the unanimous opinion in Whaling,70 in which the Supreme Court
had little trouble finding the retroactive repeal of an early parole process to
violate section 11(h) of the Charter; United States of America v. Burns,71 on
the constitutional limits on extradition to face the death penalty; and two
decisions, May and Khela, upholding the rights of prisoners to seek timely
habeas corpus review of unlawful prison conditions.72 However, the focus of
this section will be her decision in Sauvé and what it says about the limits of
punishment and the role of courts in enforcing those limits.
Sauvé was a constitutional challenge to section 51(e) of the Canada
Elections Act,73 which disenfranchised prisoners serving a sentence of two
years or more. Rick Sauvé, a lifer, together with a group of Indigenous
prisoners, argued that prisoner disenfranchisement violated sections 3 and 15
of the Charter, the right to vote and the equality guarantee respectively.
In a 5-4 decision, the Chief Justice wrote a forceful majority opinion
finding the law to be an unjustified infringement of the section 3 Charter
right of all citizens to vote. In so doing, Sauvé imposed a significant limit
on popular punitiveness in Canada.74 The decision made clear that
prisoners — or citizen lawbreakers, to use the Court’s terminology — “do
not hold attenuated, weaker versions of the rights enjoyed by other
Canadians” and are “unequivocally full rights holders under the
Charter”.75 The Charter, the majority proclaimed, “emphatically says that
prisoners are protected citizens, and short of a constitutional amendment,
lawmakers cannot change this”.76
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The McLachlin majority holds in Sauvé that it is constitutionally
unacceptable to deny prisoner voting rights for the dual purpose of
enhancing the criminal sanction and promoting respect for the rule of
law. This kind of expressive punishment, pursued in the absence of any
evidence of its efficacy,77 was defended by the government as a
reasonable limit on the right to vote under section 1. For the Chief
Justice, those objectives barely scraped through the first stage of the
Oakes analysis,78 while they enjoyed strong support among the
dissenting judges who were very deferential to the government’s vague
justifications. Chief Justice McLachlin’s opinion pushes back against the
popular acceptance of harsh punishments, particularly where there is
simply no evidence they are necessary or effective.
It is worth contemplating the impact of Sauvé since it has become an
important precedent internationally. Sauvé takes Canada in a fundamentally
different direction from our American neighbours, where lifetime bans on
even former prisoners ever voting have been upheld as constitutional.79 The
Sauvé majority has been influential in decisions to reject prisoner voting
bans on human rights grounds by the European Court of Human Rights,80
the South African Constitutional Court,81 and the High Court of Australia,82
among others.
Domestically, Sauvé also set a new tone for rights litigation by prisoners
in the Charter era. While some judges continue to meet prisoner’s rights
claims with a posture of deference toward correctional legislation and
decision-making,83 we have seen some important successes by prisoners in
constitutional and human rights cases dealing with conditions of
confinement. For example, in the recent trial decisions in Ontario84 and
77
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British Columbia85 declaring unconstitutional certain aspects of the federal
law authorizing solitary confinement, deeply entrenched and widespread
correctional laws and policies are being subjected to close scrutiny and
have been found wanting. Sauvé is rightly considered an important case for
limiting the state’s power to punish.86

III.

THE FUTURE OF RESTRAINING PUNISHMENT

The political process has utterly failed to rein in punishment. Under
Harper, punitive laws proliferated but despite promises of the Trudeau
government to roll back some of these excesses and to reform criminal
law more broadly, the results so far have been disappointing. The pointed
prompt from the Supreme Court in Nur and Lloyd to at least provide a
safety valve from the excesses of mandatory sentences has not yet
yielded a legislative response.87 With at least 174 Charter challenges to
mandatory minimum sentences before Canadian courts,88 sentencing
policy is being changed on a piecemeal and inconsistent basis.
The Liberal government’s omnibus crime bill, C-75,89 introduced in
March 2018, sets out to amend a number of Criminal Code provisions,
including those dealing with bail, preliminary inquiries, and jury selection,
but we are hearing crickets on sentencing reform (other than the proposed
increase in the Bill of the default maximum penalty for summary conviction
offences to two years less a day, from six months). Unfortunately, the only
movement is a ratcheting up, rather than a ratcheting down, of sentences.
Recently, Senator Kim Pate stepped into the legislative void,90 introducing a
Private Member’s Bill in the Senate that would restore judicial discretion to
depart from mandatory sentences where the circumstances warrant.91
85
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Perhaps the most troubling of mandatory sentences, and one that is often
left out of discussions aimed at abolishing them, is the mandatory life
sentence and mandatory parole ineligibility periods for murder (25 years for
first degree murder and between 10 to 25 years for second degree murder).92
Under this mandatory sentencing regime, which is harsh by international
standards,93 Canadians sentenced for murder are spending many more years
in prison today than they did at the time capital punishment was abolished in
1976.94 Nearly one quarter of people under federal correctional supervision
are lifers.95 The impact of these sentencing provisions is gendered and
racialized, as it is for other mandatory sentences. From 2005 to 2015,
Indigenous women comprised 44 per cent of new women lifers, and this
overrepresentation is even more pronounced than it is for Indigenous men.96
Canada’s murder sentencing regime has become more punitive in
recent years as Parliament has amended the Criminal Code to allow
parole ineligibility periods to be made consecutive to one another and to
abolish an important opportunity for early parole review, the so-called
“faint hope clause”. The resulting sentences, including those that amount
to de facto life without parole, raise important constitutional questions
that are beginning to come before the courts.97 Decades have passed
92

It is, however, included in Senator Pate’s Bill.
Only 11 out of 42 European Union member states impose a mandatory life sentence for
murder. In Australia, the majority of states have removed the mandatory life sentence for murder.
New Zealand has also replaced the mandatory minimum sentence for murder with a rebuttable
presumption in favour of a life sentence. While the mandatory life sentence for murder continues to
exist in England and Wales, there are no statutory minimum parole ineligibility periods for murder.
In Portugal, life sentences are constitutionally prohibited. See EU, European Commission, Study on
Minimum Sanctions in the EU Member States, (Brussels, 2015), online: <http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/criminal/document/files/rep ort_minimum_sanctions_en.pdf>, at 42.
94
In 1976 the average time in custody for capital and non-capital murder was 15.8 years
and 14.6 years, respectively. By 1999, the estimated average time that a Canadian convicted of first
degree murder spent in prison was 28.4 years: Mark Nafekh et al., A Review and Estimate of Time
Spent in Prison for Offenders Sentenced for Murder (Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2002),
online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/b27-eng.pdf>. In other comparable jurisdictions, the
number was much lower: 11 years in New Zealand; 14.4 in England; and 14.8 in Australia.
Unfortunately, more recent data is not publicly available, but trends in corrections and parole
decision-making suggest that the time lifers spend in prison before is likely at least as high (or
higher) now than it was in 1999.
95
Public Safety Canada, 2015 Annual Report: Corrections and Conditional Release Act
Statistical Overview, online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ccrso-2015/index-en.aspx>.
96
Id.
97
See, for example, R. v. Granados-Arana, [2017] O.J. No. 5964, 2017 ONSC 6785 (Ont.
S.C.J.) (upholding the constitutionality of s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code, supra, note 4, which
allows a court to order that parole ineligibility periods be served consecutively). At time of writing, a
Quebec court was seized with a Charter challenge to a 150-year parole ineligibility period made
possible by s. 745.51. The challenge was launched by Alexandre Bissonette, the man convicted of
93

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

PUNISHMENT AND ITS LIMITS

367

since the Supreme Court of Canada last considered the constitutionality
of the mandatory life sentence and parole ineligibility periods for
murder98 and first degree murder,99 in all cases finding no Charter
infringement. This question is ripe for reconsideration in the light of
legislative changes that have substantially lengthened parole ineligibility
periods, particularly given the degree to which earlier courts relied on the
faint hope clause to uphold murder sentences as constitutional.100
The approach Chief Justice McLachlin took to reviewing the
constitutionality of mandatory sentences in Nur and Lloyd and prisoner
disenfranchisement in Sauvé emphasizes the importance of looking at the
real impact and reach of these provisions. She also signalled that
evidence matters in justifying punitive laws. In Nur and Lloyd this meant
questioning the “common sense” of deterrence as a principle justifying
longer sentences and in Sauvé it meant refusing to defer to vague,
expressive justifications for punishment. The solitary confinement
Charter challenges are working their way toward the Supreme Court,101
along with the many challenges to mandatory sentences. The murder
sentencing regime is crying out for a careful examination of its impact in
relation to its policy goals and the new constitutional standard for section 12
articulated in Nur and Lloyd. The lengthening of parole ineligibility
periods, the abolition of the faint hope clause, and the way the mandatory
life sentence precludes consideration of social context and different
levels of culpability, including Gladue factors,102 combine to produce
compelling arguments that the regime is cruel and unusual. Clearly, we
are going to continue to need the Supreme Court of Canada to act as a
check on the state’s punishment agenda. In considering the cases that will
no doubt come before them, current and future judges would do well to
build on the legacy of Chief Justice McLachlin’s punishment cases.
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